When the Turkish Republic emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, it faced an extraordinary challenge: building an entirely new legal framework virtually overnight. Rather than reforming existing Islamic law, Turkish leaders made a bold decision to import complete legal codes from Western Europe. This meant that a legal system based on translation became the foundation upon which modern Turkey would stand. This ground breaking approach created one of history’s most intriguing case studies in legal transplantation and the remarkable power (and peril) of translation in shaping a nation’s law.
The resulting Turkish legal system based on translation is far more than an academic curiosity. It stands as a testament to what happens when an entire legal order is constructed through meticulous yet imperfect translation work. Today, nearly a century later, a legal system based on translation continues to influence how Turkish courts interpret laws, how lawyers argue cases, and how citizens understand their rights and obligations. Understanding this experience offers profound insights into the relationship between language, law, culture, and modernization that remains relevant for contemporary legal systems worldwide.
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Understanding A Legal System Based on Translation: The Foundation and Strategic Choices
Following the Turkish War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Mustafa Atatürk and his reformist government undertook one of history’s most ambitious legal transformations. They rejected the Islamic legal system that had governed the Ottoman Empire for centuries and chose instead to adopt a legal system based on translation from Western European models. This decision was revolutionary, but it was also pragmatic—Turkey needed functioning legal codes immediately, and creating them from scratch would have been impractical.
The choice of what to translate was highly strategic. Turkish leaders selected the Swiss Civil Code for private law because it possessed several compelling advantages over competitors. The Swiss Code was regarded as adapted to diverse customs and regional variations; it did not employ technical language and therefore would be “more easily translatable”; it was concise and well-organized; it avoided excessive judicial conceptualism; and it favored democratic principles through freedom of contract and equality of the sexes. Additionally, many Turkish legal leaders, including the Justice Minister, had studied in francophone Switzerland and were thus familiar with Swiss legal thought and civil law traditions.
A special commission of twenty-six members was tasked with translating the trilingual Swiss Civil Code, working primarily from its French version. By 1926, Turkish legal experts had translated not only the Civil Code but also produced entirely new codes for criminal law, drawn from Italy, and commerce, drawn from Germany. This extraordinary productivity demonstrated the determination to create a legal system based on translation that could rapidly modernize the Turkish state. Within just one year, the legal infrastructure of an entire nation was essentially transplanted from Europe and expressed in Turkish.
The broader context of the Turkish experience with a legal system based on translation included more than legislative codes. Eight radical reform laws called İnkilap Kanunları (Reform Laws) accompanied the new legal codes, establishing secular education, civil marriage, adopting the Latin alphabet, and systematically eliminating Ottoman-Islamic cultural elements. This was deliberate cultural revolution disguised as legal reform—a legal system based on translation served as the vehicle for this comprehensive transformation. The reforms aimed to create a new Turkish identity based on Western values rather than Islamic traditions.
The administrative law came from France, criminal procedure from Germany, and maritime law from Germany as well. This eclectic approach meant that a legal system based on translation was never purely derived from one source-law but rather represented a sophisticated synthesis of multiple European legal traditions adapted to Turkish circumstances. The complexity of managing these multiple sources during translation created challenges that would persist for decades.
The Challenge of Language: Why A Legal System Based on Translation Faces Unique Obstacles
To truly appreciate the obstacles inherent in a legal system based on translation, one must understand the profound linguistic gulf between source and target languages. Turkish is a member of the Oghuz group of Turkic languages, bearing absolutely no relationship to French, German, Italian, or English. Moreover, historical linguistic layering had created an extraordinarily complex vocabulary: centuries of Islamic rule meant thousands of Arabic terms permeated legal discourse, while Persian dominated Ottoman administrative language and high culture.
The Ottoman Turkish language that had governed the empire for centuries was vastly different from modern Turkish. When educated Turks of the Ottoman period wrote formally, they employed an elaborate style filled with Arabic and Persian terminology that ordinary Turkish speakers could not understand. When the Turkish language reform movement began eliminating Ottoman Turkish and replacing Arabic and Persian terms with Turkish alternatives, a legal system based on translation faced a unique crisis of linguistic transformation.
The codes had been translated in 1926 using Ottoman script and terminology. When Turkey adopted the Latin alphabet in 1928, the entire written corpus had to be transcribed and subsequently revised. This double transformation—adopting new letters and then simplifying language—created substantial disruption. Simultaneously, efforts to simplify language and create purely Turkish legal terminology continued, creating what one Turkish scholar called a “semantic earthquake.” Students learning law in the 1960s found the texts increasingly incomprehensible as terminology changed but written codes remained static.
The problem intensified because a legal system based on translation requires not merely finding equivalent words but conveying equivalent legal concepts across fundamentally different linguistic and cultural contexts. Turkish translators faced an unprecedented challenge: they possessed knowledge of French, German, or Italian but often lacked deep understanding of the legal systems those languages expressed. As one observer noted, the translators were not necessarily professional linguists but rather legal experts with language capability. Few had any formal training in legal translation itself—a discipline barely existed in 1926.
Consider a fundamental principle that specialists understand: legal terminology possesses system-specificity. Words in one legal system cannot simply be converted into another without losing connotation, implication, and subtle meaning accumulated through centuries of judicial interpretation. When a legal system based on translation imports Swiss law, it imports not just words but an entire conceptual apparatus rooted in Swiss legal culture, history, political traditions, and social conditions. Turkish courts and lawyers had to navigate this reality constantly, often without explicit guidance.
Turkish is phonetic in its structure, meaning a direct correspondence exists between symbols and sounds. This created an additional layer of complexity. Foreign words borrowed from French, German, Italian, and English had to be converted into Turkish symbols to be pronounced correctly. The spelling had to conform to Turkish phonetic patterns. Later, when English became increasingly influential in international law and commerce, new tensions emerged between traditional European legal terminology rooted in a legal system based on translation and contemporary English legal concepts.
Translation Errors and Their Persistent Consequences in A Legal System Based on Translation
The consequences of constructing a legal system based on translation without perfect linguistic precision became apparent almost immediately to careful observers. Cevdet Menteş, President of the Turkish Court of Cassation (Yargitay), formally acknowledged translation errors in at least nine specific articles of the Civil Code in a speech commemorating the code’s fiftieth anniversary. However, he noted that mistakes and inaccuracies were not limited to these obvious cases—additional weaknesses of expression permeated the translated texts throughout.
One particularly illuminating error involved Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, which establishes fundamental interpretive principles. The German version states that law applies to all questions “nach Wortlaut oder Auslegung” (according to wording or interpretation). The French version reads “la lettre ou l’esprit” (the letter or spirit), while Italian offers “la lettera od il senso” (the letter or sense).
A legal system based on translation adopting only the French version missed the subtle differences in these formulations and their implications for legal interpretation. Turkish courts subsequently had to wrestle with whether a legal system based on translation should be interpreted literally or whether more flexible interpretation was permissible—a question that arose directly from the translation choice made in 1926.
Another fascinating case involved international human rights law. The CEDAW Convention (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) was translated using the word “önlenme” meaning “prevention” to correspond to “elimination” rather than “tasfiye” or “ortadan kaldırılma,” both of which translate “elimination” or “removal” more accurately.
These Turkish words carry their own connotations and legal implications. Some Turkish feminist lawyers argued this translation error in a legal system based on translation’s application of international law was deliberate, designed to create ambiguity allowing Turkey to narrow its obligations under the Convention. Whether intentional or not, the case demonstrates how translation choices carry profound substantive consequences for fundamental human rights.
The word “mortgage” provides another instructive example of a legal system based on translation struggling with new concepts. When Turkey passed the 2007 Mortgage Statute (Mortgage Yasası), legislators left the English word “mortgage” in the statute’s title and attempted to explain it using Turkish neologisms like “ipotekli konut kredisi” (housing loan with mortgage).
To Turkish speakers unfamiliar with English pronunciation, the word “mortgage” sounded utterly foreign and remained meaningless. Since Turkish is phonetically structured, speakers pronounced it according to Turkish sound patterns with amusing results. This case demonstrates how a legal system based on translation must continually grapple with new borrowing, cultural concepts that do not fit existing frameworks, and the tension between fidelity to source concepts and accessibility to ordinary citizens.
The problem of arbitration agreements illustrates how translation gaps could create genuine legal uncertainty. The Turkish Code of Civil Procedure Article 533 differs significantly from its German source-law (the Neuchâtel Code Article 488). The source provision included the phrase “unless otherwise contracted,” which mysteriously disappeared from the Turkish version.
This gap in translation created genuine uncertainty about when arbitration awards could be appealed. The Yargitay struggled with this lacuna for years, ultimately deciding that arbitration awards could be appealed even when parties had agreed otherwise—an interpretation arguably contrary to the source-law’s intent.
The Swiss-Turkish Legal Synthesis: How A Legal System Based on Translation Created Something Genuinely New
Remarkably, despite—or perhaps because of—a legal system based on translation, something genuinely innovative emerged over time. As decades passed, Turkish courts, academics, and legislators adapted the borrowed Swiss, German, and Italian legal materials to Turkish circumstances and evolving values. Turkish Civil Law, Turkish Commercial Law, and Turkish Criminal Law gradually developed their own distinctive character while maintaining connection to source traditions.
The relationship between Turkish courts and source-laws became nuanced and sophisticated. Higher courts acknowledged the translated codes’ foreign origins while asserting interpretive autonomy. Judges and scholars referred to the Swiss, German, and Italian legal traditions as aids to interpretation and modernization rather than binding authorities. This approach allowed a legal system based on translation to evolve beyond mechanical imitation into authentic Turkish jurisprudence.
The institutional support for this development proved crucial to the success of a legal system based on translation. Fortunately, before World War II, Swiss, Austrian, and German academics fled Nazi persecution and found sanctuary in Turkish universities at Istanbul and Ankara. Professors such as Schwartz, König, Neumark, and Ernest Hirsch held academic positions where they taught the underlying principles of the source-legal systems.
Their presence ensured that Turkish legal professionals understood not merely the translated words but the legal philosophy animating them. Gradually, their Turkish assistants became professors themselves, facilitating what scholars call “internal diffusion and infusion” of legal ideas. This scholarly continuity helped a legal system based on translation develop authentic Turkish roots while preserving meaningful connection to continental European legal traditions.
The concept of “mirasta iade” (rapport successoral/rapport à succession in French and German versions of Swiss code) illustrates both the challenges and creative adaptation within a legal system based on translation. This institution, unfamiliar to Ottoman law but originating in both Roman and Germanic traditions, was largely ignored by Turkish lawyers initially.
Turkish translators chose the word “iade” (return), which Professor Necip Kocayusufpaşaoğlu criticized as inadequate for capturing the full scope of the concept. He proposed “denkleştirme” (equalization) as more accurate, but because courts and scholars had long used “iade,” changing terminology created its own confusion. This reflected the practical reality that a legal system based on translation cannot simply be corrected backward to perfection once established.
Modernization and Evolution: The 2002 Civil Code and A Legal System Based on Translation’s Adaptability
The trajectory of a legal system based on translation did not end with 1926. In 2001, Turkey enacted a completely new Civil Code that entered force on January 1, 2002. Though not itself a translation of the Swiss Code, the 2002 Civil Code maintained systematic and structural alignment with its Swiss predecessor. Importantly, this modernized code reflected changes that had meanwhile occurred in Switzerland itself, demonstrating that the experience of a legal system based on translation continued evolving and incorporating international best practices.
The 2002 Civil Code represented a watershed moment for gender equality and women’s rights. It abolished the concept of the male head of household, established spousal equality as a foundational principle, granted equal inheritance rights to children born outside marriage, and raised the minimum marriage age to eighteen for both sexes.
The code also simplified legal language significantly, replacing outdated terminology with comprehensible, modern Turkish expressions. This linguistic modernization addressed one of the perpetual challenges of a legal system based on translation: making complex legal concepts accessible to ordinary citizens rather than only to legal professionals.
The significance of this cannot be overstated. A legal system based on translation that began by importing foreign law had developed sufficient maturity to reject parts of its heritage and move forward independently.
Turkish legislators demonstrated they could maintain the systematic structure inherited from Switzerland while transforming content to reflect contemporary values and international human rights norms. The reforms eliminated hundreds of pages of outdated terminology, making a legal system based on translation actually more accessible and coherent for modern users.
The new code also incorporated more than thirty amendments in the criminal sphere addressing gender equality and protection of women’s rights. These reforms demonstrated that a legal system based on translation could evolve to incorporate modern values while maintaining structural continuity with its historical foundations. Turkish lawmakers proved capable of adapting received legal traditions to serve contemporary justice objectives rather than being imprisoned by historical translation choices.
Practical Problems and Real Cases: When A Legal System Based on Translation Breaks Down
A legal system based on translation becomes truly visible and problematic when courts must confront translation errors in specific real cases with real consequences. Professor Ernest Hirsch, one of the foreign academics teaching in Turkey, vividly described the complications of a legal system based on translation. He taught commercial law without knowing Turkish, using two different unofficial French translations of the Commercial Code that were not identical to each other.
Different translators had drawn from different foreign codes during the 1920s, creating an eclectic mixture requiring translation itself. His Turkish colleagues joked that “the Code is a Russian salad in need of mayonnaise to be put on top by you.” This colorful metaphor captures the genuine incoherence that a legal system based on translation can generate when translation choices are inconsistent.
In inheritance law cases, a legal system based on translation stumbled repeatedly over the concept of “mirasta iade.” This institution, unfamiliar to Ottoman law and originating in both Roman and Germanic traditions, created confusion for decades. The choice of terminology had practical legal consequences—what exactly could be required to be brought back into the succession for equalization purposes? Did it include only property, or also certain gifts? The limitations of the Turkish word “iade” (return) prevented clear expression of these distinctions.
When the CEDAW Convention on discrimination against women was ratified, Turkish feminist lawyers studying the official translation noted significant problems. The translation rendered “elimination” as “prevention,” which some argued narrowed Turkey’s obligations. Additionally, “her türlü” in the title meant “all kinds,” whereas alternative translations would have been “in all its forms.”
These differences were not trivial—they affected whether Turkey’s legal obligations applied to eliminate existing discrimination or merely prevent new discrimination. The controversy surrounding a legal system based on translation’s application to international human rights law demonstrated that translation choices have profound consequences.
In criminal law, similar problems emerged. Early Turkish practice sometimes misinterpreted the codes because practitioners understood neither their precise meaning nor their underlying legal philosophy. References in criminal cases to Italian law were mostly in dissenting opinions attempting to challenge mistaken interpretations of the 1926 Turkish Criminal Code and correct mistakes in translation at the time of reception. The dissenting opinions resorted to Italian sources to demonstrate what the original intent actually was.
FAQ: Understanding A Legal System Based on Translation and Its Implications
Q: Why did Turkey choose to import foreign codes rather than reform existing Ottoman law?
A: After the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, Turkish leaders believed complete modernization required wholesale legal transplantation rather than incremental reform of Islamic legal principles. They wanted to eliminate Islamic legal principles and Ottoman institutional legacies entirely, creating a secular, European-style legal order that would signal Turkey’s commitment to westernization and modernity. Gradual reform would have been too slow and would have perpetuated Ottoman traditions they sought to eliminate.
Q: Are translation errors in the Turkish codes still causing problems in courts today?
A: Yes, though their significance has diminished over ninety years. Turkish courts apply “corrective interpretation,” consulting source-laws when translation ambiguities arise. The 2002 Civil Code modernization addressed many outdated expressions, but some original translation choices remain embedded in Turkish legal terminology. Courts now understand these choices as historical artifacts and interpret them accordingly.
Q: How can a legal system founded on translation work effectively if translation is inherently imperfect?
A: The Turkish experience demonstrates that law possesses remarkable autonomy from its linguistic expression. Courts, scholars, and legislators can work with imperfect translations by actively interpreting and adapting them to serve justice. Creative interpretation can either eliminate translation errors over time or deliberately steer law in new directions. What matters most is sophisticated institutional engagement with translated texts.
Q: Is the Turkish experience unique, or have other countries adopted similar approaches?
A: While Turkey’s scale and deliberation make it exceptional, other post-colonial and modernizing nations have adopted foreign legal codes. However, few examples match Turkey’s comprehensiveness or explicit reliance on a legal system based on translation as the primary vehicle for legal transformation. India, Egypt, and other post-colonial nations adopted aspects of foreign law, but rarely to Turkey’s complete extent.
Q: How has the dominance of English in contemporary international law affected Turkish legal terminology?
A: Modern neologisms like “mortgage” demonstrate English’s increasing influence on Turkish legal language. Geoffrey Lewis described this as “the new yoke,” with English words infiltrating Turkish at unprecedented speed. This creates new tensions for a legal system based on translation originally rooted in French, German, Italian, and Swiss legal traditions, now competing with direct English borrowing.
Q: Has the Turkish Civil Code’s Swiss foundation created problems in European Union integration?
A: Somewhat ironically, Switzerland is not an EU member, so Turkish legal alignment with EU standards often required departing from Swiss precedents rather than following them more closely. The 2002 Civil Code explicitly incorporated many EU-influenced reforms addressing gender equality, environmental protection, and consumer rights, demonstrating that a legal system based on translation can evolve beyond its original sources.
Q: Can Turkish courts ignore source-law interpretations when they diverge from Turkish values?
A: Yes, with important caveats. The Yargitay has established that source-laws serve as interpretive aids and correctors rather than binding authorities. However, deliberately departing from source-law must be justified—either through legislative amendment or explicit court reasoning. Simple deviation based on preference is generally impermissible because courts must explain their reasoning and demonstrate genuine legal grounds for departure.
The Broader Significance: Why A Legal System Based on Translation Matters for Modern Law
A legal system based on translation ultimately raises profound philosophical questions about the relationship between law, language, and culture. The Turkish experience challenges romantic notions that law is forever bound to the specific culture and language that produced it. If law were truly inseparable from its cultural matrix, Turkey’s legal transplantation should have failed catastrophically. Instead, it succeeded sufficiently to create a functioning, evolving legal system that has endured for nearly a century.
Yet the Turkish experience also demonstrates real costs and challenges. Translation inevitably involves some loss of meaning, some displacement of concepts from their native soil. A legal system based on translation requires extraordinary care in translation quality, sophisticated interpretation by courts and scholars, and willingness to evolve beyond source-law when necessary. It cannot operate on autopilot; it demands active institutional engagement with fundamental questions of meaning, purpose, and justice.
The role of comparative law in supporting a legal system based on translation proves crucial. Turkish judges and scholars who understand the source-legal traditions can navigate ambiguities more intelligently. Conversely, ignorance of source-law creates dangers—early Turkish practice sometimes misinterpreted the codes because practitioners understood neither their precise meaning nor their underlying legal philosophy. Education about source-laws becomes essential to maintaining coherence.
For legal pluralism and international law, a legal system based on translation offers important lessons. As nations increasingly adopt international legal norms and obligations, questions of translation become more pressing. How can international human rights law be meaningfully translated into diverse legal systems? What happens when translation creates ambiguity about state obligations? The Turkish experience suggests that translation issues require explicit attention and sophisticated institutional mechanisms.
Conclusion: How A Legal System Based on Translation Demonstrates Law’s Adaptability
The Turkish experience with a legal system based on translation represents one of comparative law’s most consequential experiments. It demonstrates that through meticulous translation, international scholarly engagement, creative judicial interpretation, and willingness to adapt, an entire legal order can be reconstituted across linguistic and cultural boundaries. Yet it simultaneously illustrates translation’s limitations, the persistence of linguistic ambiguity, and the ongoing challenges of maintaining coherence across legal language and culture.
Today’s Turkish law remains recognizably descended from its Swiss, German, and Italian foundations while having developed distinctly Turkish characteristics. A legal system based on translation proved capable of serving Turkish needs for equality, modernization, and justice. Yet it required constant vigilance, scholarly attention, and creative judicial interpretation to overcome the inevitable gaps and ambiguities that translation introduces.
For scholars of comparative law, legal translation, and legal modernization, the Turkish experience offers invaluable lessons. A legal system based on translation can work, but never automatically or effortlessly. It requires institutional commitment, sophisticated legal education, active court engagement with source materials, and willingness to depart from borrowed models when genuine Turkish values and contemporary needs demand it.
Perhaps most importantly, it demonstrates that law is more autonomous and adaptable than cultural determinists acknowledge, while simultaneously confirming that language and culture matter profoundly in shaping legal meaning and practice.
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