Every law student, sooner or later, runs into the same puzzle: Parliament writes the words, but it is the judge who must decide what those words mean when a real dispute lands on her desk. That gap between the words on paper and the situation in front of the court is exactly what this Unit is about. Before we can learn the specific rules judges use (that comes in later Units), we must first understand the raw material they work with: what a statute actually is, how it is born (commencement), how it lives (operation), how it dies (repeal), and why the whole exercise of ‘Interpretation‘ is needed at all.
Interpretation is the Art of knowing the true sense of legislature or enactment / statute by giving the general / ordinary or natural meaning.
Table of Contents
Landmark Case : Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc. v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola & Anr. (AIR 1961 SC 1325 / 1961 12 STC 286 SC)
1. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION & PRINCIPLE
Statute: Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Section 6 read with Schedule II).
Rule/Principle of Interpretation: Rule of Common Parlance / Popular Sense / Ordinary & Natural Meaning (Literal Rule of Construction).
Core Maxim: Words in a statute (especially taxing statutes and everyday terms) must be understood in their popular/ordinary sense – how common people or merchants understand them—and not in their technical, scientific, or botanical sense.
2. FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioners were dealers in betel leaves (Paan) in Akola.
The Assistant Sales Tax Officer assessed them to sales tax under the C.P. & Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947.
Schedule II of the original Act contained separate exemption entries:
Item 6: “Vegetables—except when sold in sealed containers”.
Item 36: “Betel leaves”.
By an amendment (Act 16 of 1948), the Legislature deleted Item 36 (“Betel leaves”) from the exemption schedule.
The petitioners argued that despite the deletion of Item 36, betel leaves were still exempt under Item 6 because botanically, betel leaves are plant products and fall under the broad dictionary definition of “vegetables”.
3. KEY ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
- Whether “betel leaves” (Paan) fall within the definition of the term “vegetables” under Item 6 of Schedule II of the C.P. & Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947.
- Whether the word “vegetable” should be construed using its botanical/scientific definition or its popular/common parlance meaning.
4. JUDGMENT & RATIO DECIDENDI
The Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) dismissed the petitions and held that betel leaves are NOT “vegetables” for the purpose of tax exemption:
- Rule of Popular Sense (Common Parlance Test): The word “vegetable” is a term of everyday use. Since it was not defined in the statute, it must be understood in its popular sense—the sense attributed to it by the common man, kitchen users, and green-grocers, rather than botanists.
- Meaning of “Vegetable”: In common usage, “vegetables” refer to produce grown in kitchen gardens and harvested for the table/cooking (e.g., consumed as part of a meal). Betel leaves are consumed as a masticatory/digestive after meals, not cooked or served as table food.
- Legislative Intent: The original Act kept “Vegetables” and “Betel leaves” as two distinct entries. The deliberate omission/deletion of “Betel leaves” by the amendment clearly indicated the legislature’s intent to remove the sales tax exemption from betel leaves.
| 💡 Why This Unit Matters Lord Hailsham once remarked that nearly nine out of ten cases heard by the highest English courts turn on the meaning of words in a statute or in delegated legislation. In India too, a huge share of litigation, from tax disputes to matrimonial cases, is really a dispute about what a particular section means. Master this Unit and you will find every later Unit (and most of your future legal practice) far easier to follow. |
1. Meaning of the Term ‘Statute’
The word ‘statute’ comes from the Latin word ‘statutum’, meaning ‘that which is established’ or ‘that which is laid down’. In everyday legal usage, a statute is a written law formally enacted by a competent legislative body such as Parliament or a State Legislature. It is the deliberate, written expression of the will of the legislature, as opposed to case law (judge-made law) or custom.
According to Salmond, a statute is one of the sources of law that consists of the declaration of legal rules by a competent legislative authority. Craies describes a statute as the will of the legislature communicated to us by means of the words used in the document called an ‘Act of Parliament’. In India, the term ‘Act’ and ‘statute’ are generally used interchangeably: for example, the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Indian Penal Code (now the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita), 1860 style enactments are both statutes.
Statute, Act, Ordinance, Rule: Not the Same Thing
Students often confuse these terms. Here is a quick comparison that will save you marks in the examination:
| Term | What it means | Who makes it |
| Statute / Act | A law passed by the legislature following the full law-making procedure (introduction of bill, readings, passing by both Houses, assent). | Parliament or State Legislature |
| Ordinance | A temporary law having the same force as an Act, promulgated when the legislature is not in session and immediate action is needed. | President (Art. 123) or Governor (Art. 213) |
| Rules / Regulations | Detailed provisions made under the authority given by a parent Act to work out its purpose (delegated or subordinate legislation). | Executive / administrative authority under statutory power |
| Bye-law | Rules made by a local or statutory body (municipality, university) for matters within its own limited sphere. | Local authority / statutory corporation |
| 🎓 Interesting Fact: The General Clauses Act, 1897 is sometimes nicknamed the ‘dictionary of Indian statutes’. It supplies standard definitions (like ‘person’, ‘immovable property’, ‘financial year’) and standard interpretation rules (commencement, repeal, gender and number) so that every single Act does not have to repeat them. Whenever you are confused about a general interpretation question in India, the General Clauses Act is usually your first stop. |
2. Kinds of Statutes
Statutes can be classified from several different angles: how long they last, how strictly their words must be obeyed, what purpose they serve, and to whom they apply. Examiners love this classification because it can be tested through short definitional questions as well as through problem-based questions (‘identify the kind of statute and its rule of construction’). Study the table below carefully; the classification by object is the most examination-relevant.
(A) Classification by Duration
| Type | Meaning | Example |
| Temporary Statute | Its period of operation is fixed by the statute itself. It automatically expires (lapses) at the end of that period unless extended, and does not need a separate repealing Act. | The Finance Act (renewed every year); COVID-19 special Acts with a sunset clause |
| Permanent (Perpetual) Statute | No time limit is mentioned. It continues indefinitely, but ‘permanent’ does not mean ‘unchangeable’: it can still be amended or repealed by a later Act. | Indian Contract Act, 1872; Indian Penal Code, 1860 |
(B) Classification by Nature of the Direction
| Type | Meaning |
| Mandatory (Imperative/Obligatory) Statute | Compels performance of a certain act in a certain manner; non-compliance ordinarily makes the act invalid or void. |
| Directory (Permissive) Statute | Merely directs or permits that a thing be done, without an absolute compulsion; substantial compliance is usually enough and non-compliance does not automatically invalidate the act. |
| ⚖️ Landmark Case State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912: The Supreme Court held that the use of the word ‘shall’ does not automatically make a provision mandatory. The real test is the purpose and scheme of the statute, and the consequence that non-compliance would have on the rights of the parties. A similar approach was taken in Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, (1980) 1 SCC 403, where the Court laid down several factors (nature and scheme of the Act, intention of the legislature, consequences of non-compliance, and whether the provision is procedural or substantive) to decide whether a provision is mandatory or directory. |
(C) Classification of statute by Object
This is the classification examiners test most frequently. Each type below tells you something about how a court is likely to interpret that statute (a point we return to in Unit 4 on strict and beneficial construction).
| Type | Meaning | Example |
| Codifying Statute | Gathers and restates the whole law (statutory + case law + custom) on a subject in one systematic code. | Indian Contract Act, 1872; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 |
| Consolidating Statute | Collects together provisions scattered across several earlier Acts into a single Act, generally without changing the law. | Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now BNSS, 2023) |
| Declaratory Statute | Removes doubts or clarifies the existing law; usually applies retrospectively because it merely says what the law always was. | Explanations added to clarify an earlier ambiguous provision |
| Remedial Statute | Provides a new remedy, corrects a defect, or advances social welfare; given a liberal / beneficial construction in favour of the class it protects. | Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Minimum Wages Act, 1948 |
| Enabling Statute | Enlarges or confers a power; makes lawful something that would otherwise not be lawful. | Land Acquisition Act (enables compulsory acquisition of land) |
| Disabling (Restrictive) Statute | Cuts down or restricts a right that would otherwise exist at common law. | Statutes imposing restrictions on alienation of tribal land |
| Penal Statute | Creates an offence and imposes punishment; strictly construed in favour of the accused when the language is ambiguous. | Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 |
| Taxing Statute | Imposes a tax or levy; strictly construed, no tax by ‘intendment’, only by clear words. | Income Tax Act, 1961 |
| Explanatory Statute | Explains or clarifies the meaning of an earlier statute without altering its substance. | Amending Acts inserting an ‘Explanation’ clause |
| Amending Statute | Adds to, alters or varies the provisions of an existing statute. | The Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1976 |
| Repealing Statute | Expressly puts an end to (abrogates) an earlier statute, wholly or partly. | Repealing and Amending Acts passed periodically by Parliament |
| Curative / Validating Statute | Cures a defect in an earlier law or validates actions that would otherwise be invalid, usually with retrospective effect. | Validation Acts passed after a tax provision is struck down on a technical ground |
(D) Classification of statute by Application
| Type | Meaning |
| Public (General) Statute | Applies to the community at large or to the whole territory; courts take judicial notice of it without proof. |
| Private (Special/Local) Statute | Applies only to a particular person, association, institution, or a limited local area. |
(E) Classification of statute by Time of Operation
A statute may also be prospective (operating only on facts and transactions arising after it comes into force) or retrospective (reaching back to affect rights and transactions that occurred before it came into force). We examine this in more detail under ‘Operation of Statutes’ below, since it is one of the most frequently asked topics in University examinations.
3. Commencement of Statutes
‘Commencement’ refers to the point in time at which a statute comes into force and begins to have legal effect. Getting this date right matters enormously in practice: it decides whether a transaction, offence, or right falls inside or outside the new law.
Under Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act comes into operation on the day on which it receives the assent of the President (for a Parliamentary Act) or the Governor (for a State Act), and operates from the very beginning of that day. However, many statutes contain their own commencement clause, most commonly a provision reading, ‘It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.’ Such deferred commencement is a well-recognised form of what is called ‘conditional legislation’, where the legislature fixes the policy and leaves only the date (or the extension of the law to an area) to be decided by the executive.
| ⚖️ Landmark Case A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710: The National Security Act, 1980 was enacted, but the enforcement of certain safeguard provisions (Sections 3(3) and 8 relating to advisory boards) was left to be notified later by the Central Government. Years passed without notification. The Supreme Court held that although this delay was unfortunate, the Act itself was validly conditional legislation, and mere delay in appointing the date did not by itself make the provisions unconstitutional. The case is a good illustration of how commencement can be deliberately deferred and left to executive discretion. |
A useful practical point: where different provisions of the same Act are brought into force on different dates (very common with large codes), each provision is treated, for purposes of commencement, almost as if it were a separate Act coming into force on its own notified date.
4. Operation of Statutes: Prospective and Retrospective
Once a statute has commenced, the next question is: to which facts does it apply? Does it look only forward (prospective operation), or does it also reach back and alter rights and liabilities that already existed before it came into force (retrospective operation)?
The general rule, and a very strong presumption of interpretation, is that a statute is prospective unless the legislature has expressly stated, or shown by necessary implication, that it is meant to operate retrospectively. This presumption is strongest for statutes that touch vested rights, and it is at its very strongest for penal statutes, because Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India expressly forbids conviction for an act that was not an offence at the time it was committed, and forbids a penalty greater than what was prescribed at that time.
Procedural law, however, is treated differently from substantive law. Since no person has a vested right in a particular procedure, changes to procedural rules (for example, a new law on which court has jurisdiction to try a pending matter) are ordinarily applied even to pending proceedings, unless they would cause serious injustice.
| ⚖️ Landmark Cases on Operation Govinddas v. Income Tax Officer, (1976) 1 SCC 906: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that unless a contrary intention appears, a statute, especially a taxing or fiscal statute affecting substantive rights, is presumed not to be retrospective; every attempt should be made to give it prospective effect only. New India Assurance Co. v. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237: Held that changes in procedural law (here, the forum for filing a motor accident claim) apply even to pending matters, because a change of forum or procedure does not take away any vested right; a litigant has no vested right in a particular procedure. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128: A prosecution had begun under a Press Act before the Constitution commenced. The Supreme Court held that Article 13(1) of the Constitution (which makes pre-Constitution laws void to the extent of inconsistency with fundamental rights) operates prospectively, and does not wipe out a prosecution that was validly pending when the Constitution came into force. |
5. Repeal of Statutes
‘Repeal’ means the abrogation or setting aside of a statute (wholly or partly) by a subsequent legislative Act. A statute may be repealed in two ways:
- Express Repeal: The later Act specifically and expressly states that an earlier Act (or a particular section of it) is repealed. Parliament periodically passes ‘Repealing and Amending Acts’ precisely for this purpose.
- Implied Repeal: The later statute does not use the word ‘repeal’ at all, but is so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, an earlier statute covering the same field that the two cannot possibly stand together. Courts start with a strong presumption against implied repeal, and first attempt a harmonious construction that lets both provisions survive; only when reconciliation is genuinely impossible will a court hold that the earlier law stands impliedly repealed (the maxim used is leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant: later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws).
Effect of Repeal: Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897
This is one of the most important provisions in the entire syllabus, so learn it almost by heart. Section 6 provides that, unless a different intention appears, the repeal of a Central Act or Regulation does NOT:
- Revive anything that was not in force or existing at the time the repeal takes effect;
- Affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment, or anything duly done or suffered under it;
- Affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under the repealed enactment;
- Affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of an offence committed against the repealed enactment;
- Affect any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment; and any such investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed.
In short, Section 6 protects things that already happened under the old law from being wiped out simply because the old law has since been repealed, unless the new Act itself clearly says otherwise.
| ⚖️ Landmark Cases on Repeal State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84: The Supreme Court laid down the guiding test: whenever there is a repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the Court has to look at the provisions of the new Act to find out whether they indicate an intention to destroy rights and liabilities under the old Act, or an intention to preserve them. If the new Act is meant to be a continuation of the old one with modifications, rights under the old Act generally survive. Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 740: The Supreme Court held that when a provision in an old Act is repealed and simultaneously re-enacted (in substance, with or without modification) in a new Act, the substituted provision does not create a break in continuity; rather, it continues the operation of the earlier provision, and things done under the old provision are treated as done under the new one for continuity purposes. |
Section 6A of the General Clauses Act extends similar protection where the repealed enactment itself was only a textual amending Act. Section 7 deals with ‘revival of repealed enactments’ (an enactment that has been repealed can be revived only by an express provision to that effect in a later Act), and Section 8 explains how references to a repealed and re-enacted provision in other statutes are to be read, ordinarily as references to the corresponding provision of the new Act.
6. Purpose of Interpretation of Statutes
If legislative drafting were perfect and every future situation could be foreseen, courts would never need to ‘interpret’ anything: they would simply apply the words mechanically. In reality, language is an imperfect tool, and legislatures cannot anticipate every future fact situation. Interpretation exists to bridge this gap between the words used and the situation that has actually arisen before the court.
Broadly, statutes require interpretation for the following reasons:
- Complexity and drafting limitations: Statutes are drafted by different people, often blending technical and general language, which can create incoherent, vague, or ambiguous provisions.
- Anticipation of future events: A legislature cannot foresee every future scenario, so it often uses broad, indeterminate words (such as ‘reasonable’) and leaves it to courts to work out what the word means in a given case.
- The multifaceted nature of language: Words and phrases often carry more than one dictionary meaning, and each side in a dispute will naturally push the meaning that favours it; someone independent (the court) must decide which meaning the legislature intended.
- Casus omissus and lacunas: Sometimes the legislature simply overlooks a situation altogether, leaving a gap that the court must fill through interpretation, without rewriting the law.
Salmond defined interpretation as the process by which courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of the authoritative forms in which that meaning is expressed. The ultimate objective of interpretation, in every case, is to discover the intention of the legislature, sometimes called the mens or sententia legis (the mind or intention of the law), as expressed in the words of the statute.
| ⚖️ Landmark Principle Courts follow the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat: it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void. In other words, where two interpretations of the same provision are reasonably possible, one that would make the statute workable and valid, and another that would make it futile or void, courts lean towards the interpretation that upholds and validates the statute rather than defeats its object. |
7. Interpretation and Construction: Meaning and Difference
In everyday legal English, ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ are frequently used as if they were synonyms, and in Indian judgments you will very often see them used interchangeably. Jurisprudentially, however, a distinction is drawn between the two, and this distinction is a favourite short-answer question.
Interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used in a statute, by giving the words their natural, ordinary, grammatical meaning. It answers the question, ‘What do these words mean?’
Construction goes a step further. It is the process of drawing conclusions, on matters that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, by looking at the underlying object, spirit, and reason of the enactment. Construction becomes necessary when applying the literal, grammatical meaning either produces an absurd or unworkable result, or does not clearly cover the precise situation before the court. It answers the question, ‘What does this provision mean for a situation the words do not directly address?’
| Point of Difference | Interpretation | Construction |
| Basic Question | What do the words say? | What do the words mean for this situation, going beyond their literal sense? |
| Starting Point | Plain, grammatical, natural meaning of the text | Object, spirit, reason, and context of the enactment |
| When Needed | Whenever a text must be read and understood | Mainly when the plain meaning is silent, absurd, or ambiguous on the point in dispute |
| Nature | More literal and text-focused | More purposive and inference-based |
In practice, Indian courts (following writers such as G.P. Singh) do not insist on a rigid separation between the two, and both processes are ultimately aimed at the same goal: ascertaining and giving effect to the intention of the legislature. For examination purposes, however, remember that interpretation is about textual meaning, while construction is about drawing legal conclusions where the text alone does not give a complete answer.
Quick Recap in a Nutshell
| Topic | One-line takeaway |
| Statute | Written law formally enacted by a competent legislature; distinct from ordinance, rules, and bye-laws. |
| Kinds of Statutes | Classified by duration (temporary/permanent), direction (mandatory/directory), object (codifying, consolidating, declaratory, remedial, enabling, disabling, penal, taxing, explanatory, amending, repealing, curative), and application (public/private). |
| Commencement | Generally the date of assent (Sec. 5, General Clauses Act) unless a different date is notified; may be conditional legislation. |
| Operation | Prospective by default; retrospective only on clear express words or necessary implication; procedural law usually applies to pending matters. |
| Repeal | Express (explicit words) or implied (irreconcilable inconsistency); Section 6, General Clauses Act protects past rights, liabilities and pending proceedings from being wiped out by a mere repeal. |
| Purpose of Interpretation | To bridge the gap between imperfect legislative language and real disputes, and to discover the true intention of the legislature (mens legis). |
| Interpretation vs Construction | Interpretation finds the literal meaning of words; construction draws legal conclusions where the literal text is silent, absurd, or ambiguous. |
| 📝 Self-Test Questions for Revision 1. Distinguish between a codifying statute and a consolidating statute, with one example each. 2. ‘A repeal does not wash away everything that happened under the old law.’ Explain with reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 3. Why is a taxing statute generally presumed to operate only prospectively? 4. Distinguish between interpretation and construction, illustrating your answer with a suitable example. 5. What is meant by ‘conditional legislation’? Discuss with reference to A.K. Roy v. Union of India. |
Frequently Asked Questions: Interpretation of Statutes & Principles of Legislation
Q1: What is a statute, and how does it differ from an Ordinance or a Rule? A: A statute (or Act) is a formal written law passed by a legislative body (such as Parliament or a State Legislature) following full law-making procedures.
- Ordinance: A temporary law promulgated by the Executive (President under Art. 123 or Governor under Art. 213) when the legislature is not in session.
- Rules/Regulations: Subordinate legislation made by administrative authorities using powers granted by a parent Act to execute its purpose.
- Bye-laws: Local rules made by bodies like municipalities or universities for matters within their limited jurisdiction.
Q2: How are statutes classified based on their duration? A: Statutes are divided into two main categories by duration:
- Temporary Statute: Its period of operation is fixed within the Act itself and expires automatically unless specifically extended (e.g., annual Finance Acts).
- Permanent (Perpetual) Statute: It contains no expiry date and remains in force indefinitely until amended or repealed by the legislature (e.g., Indian Contract Act, 1872).
Q3: What is the primary difference between a Mandatory and a Directory statute? A: A mandatory statute compels performance in a strict manner, where non-compliance invalidates the act. A directory statute merely permits or directs action without absolute compulsion, where substantial compliance is usually sufficient. Courts determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory based on the statute’s purpose, scheme, and consequences of non-compliance, rather than just the presence of words like “shall” (State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava).
Q4: What is the distinction between a Codifying Statute and a Consolidating Statute?
A:
- Codifying Statute: Systematically gathers and restates the entire body of law on a subject, including statutory provisions, case law, and customs (e.g., Hindu Marriage Act, 1955).
- Consolidating Statute: Collects and combines pre-existing statutory provisions scattered across various earlier Acts into a single comprehensive Act without substantially altering the law (e.g., Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / BNSS, 2023).
Q5: When does a statute come into commencement? A: Under Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a Central Act comes into operation on the day it receives the assent of the President (or Governor for State Acts) from the very beginning of that day, unless the Act states otherwise. If an Act specifies that it will take effect on a date notified by the government in the Official Gazette, this is termed conditional legislation (A.K. Roy v. Union of India).
Q6: Are statutes prospective or retrospective in their operation? A: As a general presumption, statutes operate prospectively (forward-looking) unless express words or necessary implications state otherwise. This presumption applies strictly to laws affecting vested rights, taxing statutes (Govinddas v. ITO), and penal laws, which are constitutionally barred from retrospective application under Article 20(1). Conversely, procedural statutes are generally presumed to apply retrospectively to pending litigation (New India Assurance Co. v. Shanti Misra).
Q7: What happens to existing rights and pending proceedings when a law is repealed? A: Under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, unless a contrary intention appears in the new law, a repeal does not wipe out past operations. It protects rights, privileges, obligations, liabilities, and legal proceedings or penalties acquired or incurred under the repealed law, allowing them to be enforced as if the Act had not been repealed (State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh).
Q8: What is the Rule of Common Parlance (Popular Sense) in statutory interpretation? A: It is a rule of construction establishing that words in a statute—especially everyday terms or taxing statutes—must be interpreted in their popular, common, or commercial sense as understood by the general public or tradespeople, rather than in a technical, scientific, or botanical sense.
- Example (Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer): The Supreme Court held that “betel leaves” (Paan) do not fall under the tax-exempt category of “vegetables” because, in common parlance, vegetables refer to garden produce cooked for meals, whereas betel leaves are consumed as a post-meal masticatory.
Q9: What is the technical difference between ‘Interpretation’ and ‘Construction’? A: While often used interchangeably in practice, they differ conceptually:
Construction: The process of drawing legal conclusions beyond the literal wording by analyzing the spirit, context, and purpose of the statute when the text is ambiguous, silent, or produces an unworkable result.
Interpretation: The process of ascertaining the true grammatical and literal meaning of the text directly from the words used.
About the Author
This is a product of research by a group of advocates practicing in various High courts and Supreme court of India. The whole group has been consistently publishing on various topics and fields of laws for making the citizens aware of their right. Keep reading Kanoonpedia.com
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